Calyx has more focus on functionality and privacy rather than security. On Graphene, security is always priority #1.
For example: Calyx provides MicroG. This means you can talk to Google Play services, though in a better, more privacy-conscious way. MicroG is an open implentation of Google Play Services.
However, MicroG requires signature spoofing: You need to install a fake Google certificate so that it can trick official apps into thinking they're talking to Google Play Services directly. This could technically be abused, though Calyx takes lots of precautions to prevent that. GrapheneOS with their security-first approach don't deem this worth the risk. So with apps requiring play services you don't get push messages and network-based location checks, among others.
So, do you want an allround phone to use everyday (and use things like Uber, Facebook, etc) but more private and secure than AOSP, take Calyx. Do you want security over everything and are willing to compromise a bit on functionality and app compatibility (some apps will refuse to run without google play), pick Graphene.
I made it a privileged permission because that's a standard Android thing to gate things (such as reading of IMEI) - My thought process being that if you somehow managed to get around privileged permissions, we have much bigger problems than signature spoofing.
Yeah I agree, it's a good compromise and I definitely use MicroG despite that (though not on Calyx but Lineage for MicroG, as I don't have a Pixel phone). I think the Calyx precautions are more than adequate. And better than Lineage's.
I just wanted to highlight the difference in focus, GrapheneOS will always pick the security side when a compromise needs to be made. Another example is the "We don't lie about security features" stance about SafetyNet. Even though a GrapheneOS phone is arguably more secure than a random manufacturer-modified Android rom. I agree that signature spoofing has an unnecessarily bad name. Probably because some mainstream roms like Lineage eschewing it. Personally I think it's a great tradeoff between privacy and functionality.
This is the trade off that I hate having to make, and I'm glad to see something like Calyx here.
I want a phone that respects my privacy and is secure, but I also want to use apps like Google Photos (my favorite app that I use more than anything, aside from Firefox), Lyft, Netflix, Slack, banking apps, airline apps, and, critically, Google Pay.
I get that using many of those apps might increase my exposure to tracking and privacy leaks, but I just want an OS behind them that I know I can trust in isolation, and that may have measures in place that at least try to mitigate some of the worst privacy abuses from the apps. (And if it can't always succeed at that, that's fine, I'll live.)
Meanwhile, my only real choices are stock Android, which I know I can't trust to protect my privacy (since Google's business model depends on that), and iOS, which will treat me like a child and not let me do what I want with my phone unless Apple approves. (I'm also really concerned about the privacy implications of Apple's plan to do client-side scanning for CSAM material, assuming that's true.)
So I just don't feel like there's anything out there right now that will let me run the apps I want, that is built in top of an OS that I feel I can trust. Calyx seems to be one of the few I've seen that looks like they're actually trying to be that.
I feel similarly. However I could probably drop Netflix, Slack (at a push), Google pay (painful) if I could find a replacement for Google photos, it's been too valuable in recording my life memories. The Apple CSAM story gave me a kick to think I don't want to be sending photos in the plain to Google either.
Alternatives seem to be Owncloud and Nextcloud, which have hosted options. I don't really want to self host but nice to have the option. Does anyone have experience with their android apps for photo storage as compared to Google photos? In particular autobackup and image scaling/compression would be nice.
I use ProtonMail and have started fiddling with their new calendar offering, I was half hoping they might have some encrypted storage service in the offing...
Note that the GrapheneOS developer has indicated they are working on getting the Google Play Services apps to run sandboxed like normal apps, without extensive system permissions. This could be quite promising.
Oh wow, this is actually amazing. I'm really impressed with the work the GrapheneOS folks are doing. Ah, damn, it looks like they've dropped support for the Pixel 2. I have a Pixel 4 as my daily driver, but I'd prefer to try it first on a phone I don't use all the time. Ah well. Perhaps the 4 will still be supported whenever I get my next phone :)
You can still download the Pixel 2 images via getting the version from https://releases.grapheneos.org/walleye-testing if you really want to use it. There may be a final extended support release, but it's very insecure at this point and we won't be making those extended support releases for much longer.
At some point, the new hardware has been changed for good reason — exploits have been discovered!
Upgrading to a new-to-you few-hundred dollars Pixel every 2-4 few years isn't anywhere close to the expense of a new $600-$900 phone every 1-3yrs, the way people used to (and the way iPhone users still seem to).
I agree, this is my stance as well,. Though I don't think Calyx tries to limit tracking on installed apps. I would recommend using something like TrackerControl to limit those.
TrackerControl doesn't encrypt your DNS queries, though. You'd need to proxy DNS requests to another app like http://github.com/ch4t4r/Nebulo which supports DoT / DoH3 / DoH for that.
(disclosure: I co-develop a FOSS TrackerControl alternative)
TrackerControl has a tad better UX; is built on top of the super-stable NetGuard and hence inherits its flaws and merits.
For instance, it does not support DoH/DoT/DNSCrypt.
It also leaks DNS connections over TCP (this happens when a DNS question or answer payload is too big to fit in a single UDP packet). In fact, all userspace DNS clients on Android I have taken a look at, leak DNS queries over TCP.
TrackerControl does not trap all packets over port 53, which RethinkDNS does by default.
TrackerControl isn't geared towards bypassing censorship. RethinkDNS can bypass stateless firewalls employing a similar trick to GreenTunnel, and we plan to implement a couple more such mitigations.
Unimplemented but soon, RethinkDNS would let users block connections if apps don't resolve DNS with a resolver of their choosing.
There's three of us working on RethinkDNS full-time, so it is likely to see feature development at a faster clip than TrackerControl and NetGuard (the latter's been put under maintanence mode by its original developer).
> Calyx has more focus on functionality and privacy rather than security.
That's not true. GrapheneOS is heavily focused on privacy and offers much better privacy than CalyxOS. See https://grapheneos.org/features for the privacy and security features offered beyond AOSP. Unlike CalyxOS, we aren't listing AOSP features as our own.
CalyxOS has a leaky firewall which apps can bypass and a leaky VPN tethering implementation. GrapheneOS has a Network toggle without those leaks and prefers the approach of fine-grained VPNs rather than using the same tunnel for everything. We want real per-profile VPNs rather than making more devices use the same VPN, especially in a leaky way.
> For example: Calyx provides MicroG. This means you can talk to Google Play services, though in a better, more privacy-conscious way. MicroG is an open implentation of Google Play Services.
GrapheneOS has https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-play-services which is able to provide much better app compatibility, far more functionality and without the privacy/security sacrifices of microG. microG lacks the same security checks and key pinning of Play. It doesn't avoid trusting Play because the apps using Play are using the Play client libraries. microG is an additional trusted party.
> This could technically be abused, though Calyx takes lots of precautions to prevent that.
They simply limit it to microG and the Play services signature, which was our suggestion. That isn't taking a lot of precautions. It is abused because apps are tricked into giving their data to an app without the same security model/checks and key pinning (microG) is
> GrapheneOS with their security-first approach don't deem this worth the risk.
> So with apps requiring play services you don't get push messages and network-based location checks, among others.
Push works fine with many apps without Play. GrapheneOS has support for using Play in a sandbox.
> So, do you want an allround phone to use everyday (and use things like Uber, Facebook, etc) but more private and secure than AOSP, take Calyx.
Those apps work fine on GrapheneOS. CalyxOS isn't more private and more secure than AOSP. CalyxOS includes a lot more proprietary services (Google, WhatsApp, etc.) than AOSP. For the most part, they're making changes which quite easily hurt privacy and security.
> Do you want security over everything and are willing to compromise a bit on functionality and app compatibility (some apps will refuse to run without google play), pick Graphene.
This is a highly inaccurate portrayal of what GrapheneOS provides and the decision making process. GrapheneOS values privacy and usability very highly. It balances those with security.
What really defines GrapheneOS is that we aim to implement things in a proper way that cannot be bypassed by adversaries. A privacy feature that's simply worked around is not much of a privacy feature.
While I really appreciate your work on GrapheneOS (and I will be checking out the sandboxed Google Play Services feature), I don't think it's very good form to heavily promote your OS in a discussion about a different OS, especially in such an adversarial way. There's room in the FOSS space for both GrapheneOS and CalyxOS.
Please look at the comments being replied to from that user in this thread. They're spreading misinformation about GrapheneOS in order to promote CalyxOS. This isn't something isolated but rather than community is highly hostile towards our project and has been heavily involved in harassment of our developers, raids on our community and coordinated spreading of misinformation. Every time GrapheneOS or CalyxOS is mentioned, the CalyxOS community and project are there pretending GrapheneOS doesn't care about privacy and functionality/usability. We're only responding to the comments where this is being done. We didn't jump into this thread but rather they're choosing to attack us and bring us into it.
This looks like a messy dispute, so I'm not going to step in. The FOSS community is outnumbered by those who prefer closed source software, and it's a shame to see infighting between two projects that, despite their differences, both counter the Google/Apple duopoly on mobile device platforms. I hope the GrapheneOS and CalyxOS communities can find a way to reconcile.
> has been heavily involved in harassment of our developers, raids on our community and coordinated spreading of misinformation
I'd be interested to see how you draw this conclusion. I have been in the CalyxOS rooms for quite a long time and have never seen anything of the sort. In fact, when GrapheneOS is mentioned, users are told to change the topic.
People can see for themselves the misinformation being regularly spread about GrapheneOS by the CalyxOS community whenever either CalyxOS or GrapheneOS is brought up. The raids on our channels are a well known fact and those people are openly welcomed in the CalyxOS rooms, even those who have publicly told me to kill myself on multiple occasions. Nick himself has been heavily involved in this behavior. I don't think someone who is involved in the community perpetrating these attacks is a good source on what has been happening. He justifies his support for these people by saying they have an open channel with free speech.
> In fact, when GrapheneOS is mentioned, users are told to change the topic.
Yes, people get banned when they defend GrapheneOS from attacks. Nothing is done when they spread misinformation about it as long as they don't do it too blatantly. Action is quickly taken if someone there tries to counter it.
> The raids on our channels are a well known fact and those people are openly welcomed in the CalyxOS rooms
You've said this a number of times, but you've yet to provide any material evidence this has taken place.
From what I've seen as an impartial bystander, the CalyxOS community doesn't want anything to do with you or your (frankly hostile) community.
I've taken the liberty of doing a little digging and asking around, and it looks like you've even tied in CalyxOS to the recent Bromite impersonation incident. Judging by the chat log you shared on GitHub, it looks like the user was told to change the topic.
I really don't think it's appropriate to be downgrading and "attacking" (as you so vehemently protest) open-source projects like CalyxOS with similar goals. It's a shame such hostility is taking place, when both Calyx and Graphene are doing excellent work in the privacy sector.
I specifically avoided commenting on the comparison threads solely to not have to see this. You will not find me doing that anywhere, anytime (unless perhaps when we were on good terms)
I've done that all this time, the only time I comment on something is when somebody asks us to integrate it into CalyxOS, and that's only within our context.
You're the one here who're responding in a hostile manner, and doing exactly what you're accusing us of. Please stop.
Sorry if I misunderstood some of the differences, but I was trying to simplify it and trying to be helpful by explaining what I read about both.
I'm not trying to promote either, and I don't use either as I don't have any pixel phones. However I thought of buying one and as such I looked into the differences.
I didn't realise you now had sandboxed play services, but to be honest I would trust MicroG a lot more than Google, even if it's sandboxed :) The only way I'd want to interact with Firebase is for push notifications, I prefer MicroG's way of handling location by the way, with its location plugins pointing to really open sources. Play Services are still closed-source google components that I don't want on my phone.
I was not saying that you don't care about privacy. I just wanted to express that I generally see GrapheneOS pick the security side over privacy if there is a choice to be made between both (and only then). And with privacy I mainly mean big data tracking from the likes of Google.
I didn't mean to attack you at all. I have no side in this conflict and I'm sorry you feel that way. See also how I said in my original post that GrapheneOS has security as Priority #1. How is that a bad thing??
If you look at my other posts you will see I praised you for promoting security features that were incorporated into AOSP after you had initially developed them. I was just trying to present the situation as I understood it. I didn't realise it was so adversarial.
I'm sure you didn't do it intentionally, it's just that what you said is a common piece of misinformation spread about GrapheneOS. It's understandable that you'd think that given how much it's repeated and considering that many people got duped too.
>I would trust MicroG a lot more than Google, even if it's sandboxed :)
This is the reason that GrapheneOS sandboxes it. You can disable permissions however you'd like, nothing stops you. You don't want it to send certain data? Then don't give it that permission. Disabling INTERNET will prevent it from sending anything (it's used to privilege, so it likely won't use another app to bypass, but you can use a different profile anyway).
>Play Services are still closed-source google components that I don't want on my phone.
microG is just a reimplementation (a partial one) of Play Services. The privacy benefits are negligible.
>I just wanted to express that I generally see GrapheneOS pick the security side over privacy if there is a choice to be made between both (and only then). And with privacy I mainly mean big data tracking from the likes of Google.
I'm guessing you're referring mainly to microG.
Privacy is not just not sending data. It's far more than that. It needs to be able to blend in with others, and needs a certain decent level of security to avoid simply bypassing privacy features through vulnerabilities.
microG doesn't protect data in transit even close to the way Play Services does. How do you expect to have privacy when apps can simply intercept microG data?
Signature spoofing as microG needs, ruins the security model. It bypasses signature checks by apps. Even in CalyxOS's slightly less bad implementation, vulnerabilities in microG can be used to break out of the sandbox. How do you expect to build a security model on this? Vulnerabilities in microG are very likely, considering how the project disregards security.
How do you expect privacy with such little security? You'll not have any privacy if an app can bypass your privacy features.
It also only reimplements a portion of the APIs and breaks when apps need new ones. How is it supposed to keep up with the APIs anyway? It's tens of thousands of lines of code. It's certainly not a viable option.
Using Play Services as a sandboxed app, on the other hand, avoids this. It doesn't require the microG patch which erodes security, it protects data in transit, and it actually gets the majority of APIs and functionality working. The only functionality that doesn't work is SafetyNet attestation and functionality which depends on privilege. SafetyNet enforces using the stock OS, so you'll never get it with microG. Privileged functionality would need invasive OS integration.
It's clearly a much better solution that preserves the security model. It does it right.
GrapheneOS also optionally blends in with stock Android users. This isn't a bad thing and increases privacy. Connections made are just things like connectivity checks, nothing special.
Besides, CalyxOS isn't particularly good for this either. Their Netguard firewall that they bundle doesn't implement it properly and apps can still bypass it. They aggressively integrate Google services, and have Facebook integration as well.
Correction: because of CalyxOS' implementation of microG, signature spoofing can't easily be used to break out of the sandbox. Sorry to those whom I inadvertently misled. The fact remains that microG is still an insecure implementation that doesn't implement proper security or transit protection and disregards security.
> There's room in the FOSS space for both GrapheneOS and CalyxOS.
I doubt strcat disagrees with that. He's responding to specific statements comparing GrapheneOS and CalyxOS. I don't think we would have seen those comments if nobody had mentioned GrapheneOS.
> CalyxOS has a leaky firewall which apps can bypass and a leaky VPN tethering implementation.
We're working on fixing the one bypass. I don't know what you mean by leaky VPN tethering implementation.
We have a patch (from LineageOS) that allows tethered devices to connect over the VPN. By default in AOSP a tethered device ignores the VPN.
Wouldn't this be the opposite of leaky? It prevents leaks, especially when you have always-on VPN enabled.
> GrapheneOS has a Network toggle without those leaks and prefers the approach of fine-grained VPNs rather than using the same tunnel for everything.
We evaluated the network toggle and found it to cause crashes in apps when the permission got taken away from them unexpectedly, which is why we've gone with the solely network-level implementation.
We also do not have anything that'd make you think 'use the same tunnel for everything'. Multiple users work just fine, and in fact we now have a built-in work profile feature which lets you run another VPN in that (since that's how Android works) out of the box.
> CalyxOS includes a lot more proprietary services (Google, WhatsApp, etc.)
We do not include any proprietary services. We have microG which is open source, and the WhatsApp integration is done in open source code in the Dialer, it does not rely on anything proprietary.
In fact, you're the one who's brought up your play services approach which involves running the proprietary binary. Don't you see the irony?
Like I said in my post below I didn't mean to attack you. I don't even use either Calyx nor GrapheneOS.
> That's not true. GrapheneOS is heavily focused on privacy and offers much better privacy than CalyxOS. See https://grapheneos.org/features for the privacy and security features offered beyond AOSP. Unlike CalyxOS, we aren't listing AOSP features as our own.
I simply wanted to explain that you will always pick the security side if a balance has to be made between security and privacy. I don't mean this as a bad thing. It's a good point and a good differentiator between both IMO.
> GrapheneOS has https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-play-services which is able to provide much better app compatibility, far more functionality and without the privacy/security sacrifices of microG. microG lacks the same security checks and key pinning of Play. It doesn't avoid trusting Play because the apps using Play are using the Play client libraries. microG is an additional trusted party.
I don't agree with this. I would not want any google play stuff on my phone, sandboxed or not.
> Those apps work fine on GrapheneOS. CalyxOS isn't more private and more secure than AOSP. CalyxOS includes a lot more proprietary services (Google, WhatsApp, etc.) than AOSP. For the most part, they're making changes which quite easily hurt privacy and security.
Does Calyx really include WhatsApp out of the box? That would indeed be a very negative point for me. As I mentioned I haven't used either.
> This is a highly inaccurate portrayal of what GrapheneOS provides and the decision making process. GrapheneOS values privacy and usability very highly. It balances those with security.
As far as I understand your website you do always pick security if a tradeoff has to be made. I don't think this is a bad thing. I think it's a good option. It's just not the choice I would make but it's nevertheless a good stance for those who care about security the most.
Anyway like I said in my other post I'm sorry you view my post as an attack. If you look at my other posts you will see I praised you for promoting security features that were incorporated into AOSP after you had initially developed them.
> Does Calyx really include WhatsApp out of the box? That would indeed be a very negative point for me. As I mentioned I haven't used either.
We do not, we would never ship a proprietary app like that.
What we have is a small patch to the open source Dialer / Phone application that lets you make WhatsApp calls directly.
It only shows WhatsApp as an option if you have it installed already, if you don't you won't see it, we don't want to promote using proprietary services.
This was done after a lot of back and forth with our UX team.
GrapheneOS has the substantial privacy and security features documented at https://grapheneos.org/features. This is a list of differences from AOSP. We've landed assorted privacy/security upstream in AOSP and AOSP upstream projects like the Linux kernel. Those features are NOT listed on that page, because they aren't differences from AOSP anymore. We're confident enough in our ability to implement substantial improvements that we can land features upstream.
GrapheneOS has an easy to use web installer: https://grapheneos.org/install/web which is based on the fastboot.js library created with our funding.
We also now has a sandboxed Play services compatibility layer implementing a no compromises approach to providing app compatibility:
This will provide much more functionality than microG with better security and without sacrificing privacy by not giving Play any additional access than it has via the client libraries used by apps. It runs as a normal, sandboxed app and we provide fallback code for it to work that way. We return placeholder values for most of the privileged APIs and implement certain APIs like dynamite modules in an unprivileged way.
No need to bypass security checks in apps as has to be done to make microG work. That's a problem because microG doesn't uphold the same security model and checks as Play services. For example, it's not pinning component and server keys for important cases.
GrapheneOS currently has a much more barebones fresh install, but it's easier to install due to the web installer. The barebones installer is by design. We don't bundle proprietary services. We also don't bundle 3rd party apps and services unnecessarily rather than leaving it up to the user. We'll be providing a first party app repository with modern metadata signing, key rotation, delta update, stable/beta release channels, etc. within the next few months to make it easy for users to install an initial set of apps. High standards will be applied to the apps we choose to build for our repository.
Play Store requires API 29+ at the moment and that will be required to use the much safer unattended upgrade approach in Android 12 as opposed to the risky approach used by the Play Store, Aurora Store and F-Droid. We'll likely require API 30+ though.
F-Droid itself if API 25 (Android 7.1). The API level is the privacy/security level of an app. API 28 introduces a much stronger SELinux sandbox with per-app SELinux MLS domains protecting the app from others and other apps from it. There are many other improvements, with each API level making things better. For apps not distributed via the Play Store, this is a simple health check to see how much an app prioritizes privacy and security compared to simply getting it working.
